RAND Journal of Economics Nobel Laureates

The RAND Journal has long been a leader in the field of microeconomics, with a focus on industrial regulation, contracts, and regulation. We are pleased to have published articles in the RAND Journal (and Bell Journal) by the Nobel Laureates in Economic Sciences listed below.

Articles by Nobel Laureates

Author	Year of Award	Articles
Dale T. Mortensen	2010	Specific Capital and Labor Turnover - Autumn 1978
Leonid Hurwicz	2007	Incentive Structures Maximizing Residual Gain under Incomplete Information - Spring 1978
Eric S. Maskin	2007	An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract, I: Steady States - Spring 1979 Monopoly with Incomplete Information - Summer 1984 Contractual Contingencies and Renegotiation - Winter 1995
Edward C. Prescott	2004	Sequential Location among Firms with Foresight - Autumn 1977 Papers in Honor of Herbert A. Simon: An Introduction - Autumn 1978
Vernon L. Smith	2002	Market Contestability in the Presence of Sunk (Entry) Costs - Spring 1984 An Experimental Examination of the Walrasian Tatonnement Mechanism - Winter 1996
A. Michael Spence	2001	Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation - Autumn 1975 Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing - Autumn 1977 The Learning Curve and Competition - Spring 1981
Joseph E. Stiglitz	2001	Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and the Speed of R&D - Spring 1980 The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers’ Competition - Autumn 1995
James J. Heckman	2000	Linear Probability Models of the Demand for Attributes with an Empirical Application to Estimating the Preferences of Legislators - Quandt 1997
Daniel L. McFadden	2000	The Revealed Preferences of a Government Bureaucracy: Theory - Autumn 1975 The Revealed Preferences of a Government Bureaucracy: Empirical Evidence - Spring 1976 The Demand for Local Telephone Service: A Fully Discrete Model of Residential Calling Patterns and Service Choices - Spring 1987
Robert C. Merton	1997	Theory of Rational Option Pricing - Spring 1973 The Optimality of a Competitive Stock Market - Spring 1974
James A. Mirrlees	1996	On the Assignment of Liability: The Uniform Case - Autumn 1975 The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority Within an Organization - Spring 1976
William Vickrey	1996	Responsive Pricing of Public Utility Services - Spring 1971
Robert E. Lucas Jr.	1995	On the Size Distribution of Business Firms - Autumn 1978
Robert M. Solow	1987	Congestion Cost and the Use of Land for Streets - Autumn 1973 Extraction Costs in the Theory of Exhaustible Resources - Autumn 1976
Franco Modigliani	1985	Alternative Investment Performance Fee Arrangements and Implications for SEC Regulatory Policy - Spring 1975
George J. Stigler	1982	The Theory of Economic Regulation - Spring 1971 Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation - Autumn 1974
Herbert A. Simon	1978	On How to Decide What to Do - Autumn 1978
Kenneth J. Arrow	1972	Vertical Integration and Communication - Spring 1975
Paul A. Samuelson	1970	Proof That Properly Discounted Present Values of Assets Vibrate Randomly - Autumn 1973

RAND Journal of Economics Authors Published in Nobel Symposia in Economics

• Contracts: Determinants, Properties and Implications (1990)

  Roger Guesnerie, Alan Schwartz, Sherwin Rosen, Michael C. Jensen, Joseph E. Stiglitz

• Game Theory: Rationality and Equilibrium in Strategic Interaction (1993)

  Drew Fudenbrg, David M. Kreps, Kenneth G. Binmore, Larry Samuelson, Ehud Kalai