Winter 1995 Table of Contents

Winter 1995 Table of Contents
Symposium on The Economics of Organization

Volume 26, No. 4

Part I: The Organization of the Firm
Authors	Title
Susan Athey and Armin Schmutzler	Product and Process Flexibility in an Innovative Environment
Timothy Van Zandt	Continuous Approximations in the Study of Hierarchies
Martin Gaynor and Paul Gertler	Moral Hazard and Risk Spreading in Partnerships
Kevin Lang and Peter-John Gordon	Partnerships as Insurance Devices: Theory and Evidence
Julio J. Rotemberg and Garth Saloner	Overt Interfunctional Conflict (and its Reduction through Business Strategy)
Nahum D. Melumad, Dilip Mookherjee, and Stefan Reichelstein	Hierarchical Decentralization of Incentive Contracts
Part II: Agency Theory
Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare	Costly Distortion of Information in Agency Problems
Stephanie A. Dunne and Mark A. Loewenstein	Costly Verification of Cost Performance and the Competition for Incentive Contracts
M. Dewatripont and E. Maskin	Contractual Contingencies and Renegotiation
Jaeyoung Sung	Linearity with Project Selection and Controllable Diffusion Rate in Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problems
Steven D. Levitt	Optimal Incentive Schemes When Only the Agents' "Best" Output Matters to the Principal
Sugato Bhattacharyya and Francine Lafontaine	Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts
R. Glenn Hubbard and Darius Palia	Benefits of Control, Managerial Ownership, and the Stock Returns of Acquiring Firms