Winter 1994 Table of Contents

• Paul Beaudry and Michel Poitevin
  The Commitment Value of Contracts under Dynamic Renegotiation

• Benjamin E. Hermalin
  Heterogeneity in Organizational Form: Why Otherwise Identical Firms Choose Different Incentives for Their Managers

• Richard J. Gilbert and David M. Newbery
  The Dynamic Efficiency of Regulatory Constitutions

• Ariel Pakes and Paul McGuire
  Computing Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibria: Numerical Implications of a Dynamic Differentiated Product Model

• Douglas Gale and Robert W. Rosenthal
  Price and Quality Cycles for Experience Goods

• Arthur Fishman
  Asymmetric Price Competition with Price Inertia

• I.P.L. Png and David Reitman
  Service Time Competition

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