Summer 1994 Table of Contents

• Kathryn E. Spier
  Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules

• Gregory Vistnes
  An Empirical Investigation of Procurement Contract Structures

• Steven T. Berry
  Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product Differentiation

• Kenneth Train and Gil Mehrez
  Optional Time-of-Use Prices for Electricity: Econometric Analysis of Surplus and Pareto Impacts

• Benjamin F. Blair and Tracy R. Lewis
  Optimal Retail Contracts with Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard

• Robert C. Marshall, Michael J. Meurer, and Jean-François Richard
  Curbing Agency Problems in the Procurement Process by Protest Oversight

• Joshua Lerner
  The Importance of Patent Scope: An Empirical Analysis

• Douglas Holtz-Eakin, David Joulfaian, and Harvey S. Rosen
  Entrepreneurial Decisions and Liquidity Constraints

• Motty Perry and Larry Samuelson
  Open- versus Closed-Door Negotiations

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