Summer 1989 Table of Contents

• Nahum D. Melumad and Dilip Mookherjee
  Delegation as Commitment: The Case of Income Tax Audits

• Kenneth Hendricks and Dan Kovenock
  Asymmetric Information, Information Externalities, and Efficiency: The Case of Oil Exploration

• Steven Shavell
  Sharing of Information Prior to Settlement or Litigation

• Gerald D. Gay, Martin F. Grace, Jayant R. Kale, and Thomas H. Noe
  Noisy Juries and the Choice of Trial Mode in a Sequential Signalling Game: Theory and Evidence

• Robert Forsythe, R. Mark Isaac, and Thomas R. Palfrey
  Theories and Tests of "Blind Bidding" in Sealed-Bid Auctions

• Nancy A. Lutz
  Warranties as Signals under Consumer Moral Hazard

• Dominique M. Demougin
  A Renegotiation-Proof Mechanism for a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

• Douglas Dyer, John H. Kagel, and Dan Levin
  Resolving Uncertainty about the Number of Bidders in Independent Private-Value Auctions: An Experimental Analysis

• Robin A. Prager
  Using Stock Price Data to Measure the Effects of Regulation: The Interstate Commerce Act and the Railroad Industry

• Tables of Contents of Past Issues
• Search Abstracts
• RAND Journal of Economics WWW Page