Spring 1984 Table of Contents

• B. Douglas Bernheim
  Strategic Deterrence of Sequential Entry into an Industry

• Richard Schmalensee and Bennett W. Golub
  Estimating Effective Concentration in Deregulated Wholesale Electricity Markets

• G.F. Mathewson, and R.A. Winter
  An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints

• William P. Rogerson
  Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract

• Ralph A. Walkling and Michael S. Long
  Agency Theory, Managerial Welfare, and Takeover Bid Resistance

• Don Coursey, R. Mark Isaac, Margaret Luke and Vernon L. Smith
  Market Contestability in the Presence of Sunk (Entry) Costs

• Bruce C. Greenwald
  Rate Base Selection and the Structure of Regulation

• Jonathan Eaton and Henryk Kierzkowski
  Oligopolistic Competition, Product Variety, Entry Deterrence, and Technology Transfer

• Michael H. Riordan
  On Delegating Price Authority to a Regulated Firm

• William J. Hausman and John L. Neufeld
  Time-of-Day Pricing in the U.S. Electric Power Industry at the Turn of the Century

• Ronald R. Braeutigam
  Socially Optimal Pricing with Rivalry and Economies of Scale

• Thijs ten Raa
  Resolution of Conjectures on the Sustainability of Natural Monopoly

• James J. Opaluch and Thomas A. Grigalunas
  Controlling Stochastic Pollution Events through Liability Rules: Some Evidence from OCS Leasing

• Thomas W. Ross
  Uncovering Regulators' Social Welfare Weights

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