Spring 1979 Table of Contents

Volume 10, No. 1

A. Michael Spence
Investment Strategy and Growth in a New Market
Avinash Dixit
A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry Barriers
Jerry A. Hausman
Individual Discount Rates and the Purchase and Utilization of Energy-Using Durables
Steven Shavell
Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship
Bengt Holmström
Moral Hazard and Observability
Zvi Griliches
Issues in Assessing the Contribution of Research and Development to Productivity Growth
W. Kip Viscusi
The Impact of Occupational Safety and Health Regulation
Steven C. Salop
Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods
Ingo Vogelsang and Jörg Finsinger
A Regulatory Adjustment Process for Optimal Pricing by Multiproduct Monopoly Firms
Raymond D. Hill
Profit Regulation in Property-Liability Insurance
William B. Fairley
Investment Income and Profit Margins in Property-Liability Insurance: Theory and Empirical Results
Charles F. Manski
The Zero Elasticity Rule for Pricing a Government Service: A Summary of Findings
Jeffrey E. Harris
Pricing Rules for Hospitals
John Tschirhart and Frank Jen
Behavior of a Monopoly Offering Interruptible Service
Sudipto Bhattacharya
Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and "The Bird in the Hand" Fallacy
Martin B. Zimmerman
Rent and Regulation in Unit-Train Rate Determination
Peter A. Diamond and Eric Maskin
An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract, I: Steady States
Gerald L. Salamon and E. Dan Smith
Corporate Control and Managerial Misrepresentation of Firm Performance
Michael Rothschild and Gregory J. Werden
Returns to Scale From Random Factor Services: Existence and Scope
Herschel I. Grossman
Adverse Selection, Dissembling, and Competitive Equilibrium
Mark V. Pauly
The Ethics and Economics of Kickbacks and Fee Splitting
Mohan Munasinghe and Mark Gellerson
Economic Criteria for Optimizing Power System Reliability Levels
Robert Cooter, Lewis Kornhauser, and David Lane
Liability Rules, Limited Information, and the Role of Precedent
Tae Hoon Oum
A Warning on the Use of Linear Logit Models in Transport Mode Choice Studies
George C. Eads
Owen and Braeutigam's The Regulation Game: Strategic Use of the Administrative Process"