Autumn 1991 Table of Contents

• Michael L. Katz
  Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments

• Kevin Lang and Robert W. Rosenthal
  The Contractors' Game

• Martha A. Schary
  The Probability of Exit

• Severin Borenstein
  Selling Costs and Switching Costs: Explaining Retail Gasoline Margins

• Tracy R. Lewis and David E.M. Sappington
  Incentives for Monitoring Quality

• James Andreoni
  Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the Penalty Fit the Crime?

• John W. Mayo and Yasuji Otsuka
  Demand, Pricing, and Regulation: Evidence from the Cable TV Industry

• Richard J. Rosen
  Research and Development with Asymmetric Firm Sizes

• Richard G. Frank and David S. Salkever
  The Supply of Charity Services by Nonprofit Hospitals: Motives and Market Structure

• Michael Waldman
  The Role of Multiple Potential Entrants/Sequential Entry in Noncooperative Entry Deterrence

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