Autumn 1988 Table of Contents

• Avinash Dixit
  A General Model of R&D Competition and Policy

• Keith J. Crocker and Scott E. Masten
  Mitigating Contractual Hazards: Unilateral Options and Contract Length

• Richard Arnott and Joseph E. Stiglitz
  Randomization with Asymmetric Information

• Carolyn Pitchik and Andrew Schotter
  Perfect Equilibria in Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions: An Experimental Study

• Vojislav Maksimovic
  Capital Structure in Repeated Oligopolies

• Henrick Horn and Asher Wolinsky
  Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger

• Walter N. Thurman
  Speculative Carryover: An Empirical Examination of the U.S. Refined Copper Market

• Tracy R. Lewis and David E.M. Sappington
  Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand and Cost Functions

• Birger Wernerfelt
  Umbrella Branding as a Signal of New Product Quality: An Example of Signalling by Posting a Bond

• David P. Baron
  Regulation and Legislative Choice

• Richard R. Nelson
  Modelling the Connections in the Cross Section between Technical Progress and R&D Intensity

• Jerry L. Mashaw
  Mendeloff's The Dilemma of Toxic Substance Regulation: How Overregulation Causes Underregulation

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