Issue: Summer 1997
Pages: pp. 304-322
Authors: Philip M. Parker and Lars-Hendrik Röller
Title: Collusive Conduct in Duopolies: Multimarket Contact and Cross-Ownership in the Mobile Telephone Industry
Abstract: The deregulation of the telecommunications industry has resulted in a variety of industry structures which have been created in hopes of increasing competition. One example is the licensing of cellular telephone services in the United States where the FCC created duopolies in which two firms were granted licenses to compete in strictly defined product and geographic markets. Taking advantage of the unique regulatory environment, we test to what degree duopolistic competition leads to competitive market outcomes. We find that cross-ownership and multimarket contact are important factors in explaining non-competitive prices
Telecommunications (L960)
Market
Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: Oligopoly and Other
Imperfect Markets; monopolistic competition; contestable markets (L130)
Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: Monopoly;
Monopolization Strategies (cartels; collusion) (L120)
Industry Studies--Electrical, Gas, Communication, and
Information Services (6352)
Microeconomics--Theory of Firm and
Industry under Imperfectly Competitive Market Structures (0226)
Market
Structure: Industrial Organization and Corporate Strategy (6110)