Cake Slicing and Revealed Government Preference
Volume: Volume 13, No. 2
Issue: Autumn 1982
Pages: pp. 534-540
Authors: John Beggs and Samuel Strong
Title: Cake Slicing and Revealed Government Preference
Abstract: The literature to date on estimating government preference functions has followed the development of the multinominal logit model, employing data on discrete choice situations to elicit information on decisionmaking criteria. Most data available to economists on government decisionmaking are in the form of expenditure share allocations. Making use of familiar utility concepts, this article presents a formal model for handling expenditure share data by paying attention to the condition that the share lies between zero and one and to the condition that all shares sum to unity. The model is illustrated with a case of federal government allocations to states for education.
JEL Classification
Social Choice General (0250)
Intergovernmental Financial Relationships (3250)
Economics of Education (9120)