Welcome to the RAND Journal of Economics

The purpose of the RAND Journal of Economics, formerly the Bell Journal of Economics, is to support and encourage research in the behavior of regulated industries, the economic analysis of organizations, and more generally, applied microeconomics. Both theoretical and empirical manuscripts in economics and law are encouraged.

The RAND Journal of Economics is published quarterly by The RAND Corporation, in conjunction with Wiley-Blackwell Publishing.

Current Issue

Fall 2012 Volume 43, Issue 3, Pages 391-576

In This Issue

• A theory of delegated search for the best alternative

  Tracy R. Lewis

• A search cost model of obfuscation

  Glenn Ellison and Alexander Wolitzky

• Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships

  Elisabetta Iossa and David Martimort

• Product markets and industry-specific training

  Hans Gersbach and Armin Schmutzler

• Colluding through suppliers

  Salvatore Piccolo and Jeanine Miklós-Thal

• Payoff uncertainty, bargaining power, and the strategic sequencing of bilateral negotiations

  Silvana Krasteva and Huseyin Yildirim

• Price-cap regulation and the scale and timing of investment

  Lewis Evans and Graeme Guthrie

• Endogenous market segmentation for lemons

  Kyungmin Kim

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